The system has been corrupted by money

Florida Family Court Corruption
STOP Court’s DENIAL of REASONABLE Parent/Child CONTACT

Please sign the petition to Florida 11th Judicial Circuit Chief Judge Honorable Bertila Soto please pledge to Contact the Florida Courts – Demand Judge Manno-Schuerr’s Recusal – Reinstatement of Timesharing

STOP Court’s DENIAL of REASONABLE Parent/Child CONTACT

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Children’s Rights Florida

Access To Civil Justice?

How do you put a face on what it means to have an equal opportunity for access to civil justice? That’s difficult — but the Feb. 15 edition of The Florida Bar News attempts to do just that in their article, “Putting a human face on the civil legal access gap: Access Commission learns how the system is broken”

Look no further than the story of Miami’s Maria Garcia, said Commission member and Third DCA Clerk of Court Mary Cay Blanks during a recent January Commission meeting. Garcia was fired from her job of 15 years, denied benefits and didn’t know where to turn. When she visited Blanks’ office to file an appeal, the attendant simply handed her forms and wasn’t permitted — by law — to give her any legal advice. Unable to afford a lawyer,

Ms. Garcia left feeling frustrated and unsure of what step to take next, as if the system had failed her.

That has to change, said Blanks.

“The challenge we face in my office is being able to assist them in a meaningful way without crossing that line of giving out too much information and worrying about the unauthorized practice of law,” Blanks told the Commission. “So we err on the side of giving less information because we don’t want to cross that line. The perception is that we’re unhelpful; it causes a lot of people leaving the office disgruntled, and feeling like they are not getting their day in court, or we’re not going to help them get their day in court.”

Read why and how that process soon will change: http://bit.ly/1uwFLMS

Memo To Followers: The Ugly Truth About Why States Don’t Want Shared/Equal Parenting (Continued): 2

You may recall that I recently posted a memo describing how States are profiting from the creation of absent parents (see the link below for the original post).

Well, in that post, I only described part of the money picture the States are getting.

And while I’m still working on it, below is copy from an email I recently sent to FatherandFamilies.org that provides a bit more clarity and detail about how The Feds providing financial incentives to States who create absent parents and/or maximize child support payements.

Again, if you feel lost, the original post is linked below.

“Hi Robert:

I’ve actually been working on honing in on exactly how all this works, because even in the post you’re referencing, I acknowledged some fuzziness within my own understanding.

I’ve also been working trying to get some recent budget data on this to sort of back test what my understanding of the laws are. However, the OCE hasn’t published it’s budget since 2008.

In any case, here is my understanding of it:

There are three revenue sources for States associated with the collection and administration of child support payments defined under the broad cover of the Social Security Act:

(1) 66% reimbursement for allowable expenditures, which are:

a. Costs for locating parents
b. Costs for establishing orders
c. Costs for collecting child support payments
d. Costs for establishing paternity
e. Any other misc. costs approved by the Secretary for reimbursement.
f.  And exception of 90% matching for the following two expenditures
i.  Improving management information systems
ii. Blood testing

(2) Welfare recovery and matching:

a. Recovered TANF payments are split between the Federal Government and States consistent with Federal reimbursement of medical benefits (I’m still not clear about exactly how this part works in practice.)

(3) Incentive pool (Public Law 105-200, the Child Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1988 ( enacted July 16, 1998 ))

With the incentive pool, states must compete for their share of the funds, which I believe currently, is around $530MM to $535MM.

A. The incentive amount = State Incentive Pool (x) State Incentive Share

B. State Incentive Share = Incentive Base Amount For The State (/) Sum of Incentive Base Amounts For All States

C. Incentive Base Amount = Sum Of Applicable Percentages {defined by paragraph 6 of the Act} (x) Corresponding Maximum Incentive Base Amounts for each bonus category:
Bonus Categories Are:
A. Paternity Establishment Performance Level
B. Support Order Performance Level
C. Current Payment Performance Level
D. Arrearage Performance Level
E. Cost Effectiveness Performance Level

D. Maximum Incentive Base Amount = State Collections Base (as measured in performance categories A,B,C) + 75% state collections base ( performance categories D, E).

E. State Collections Base = Sum ( 2 (x) amount collected in which support is assigned to the State (bonus categories A or E), amount of support collected that was at the time of collection, not required to be assigned), total amount of support collected)

Summary of Observations:

If the incentive structure gives you headache, take heart. I’m an econometrician by training, and it gives me one as well. And this is why I wanted to actual figures that I could use to test this stuff out.

In any case, here is how I’m visualizing the incentive program:

Think of it is a pie; we know this is a closed mathematical domain. So, the objective for each state is to maximize their share of the pie (incentive base amounts relative to other states). And in this regard, you’ll note that the Fed’s apply a 25% penalty to the maximum incentive base amounts for two categories: (1) Support collected in arrears, and (2) Support Costs. Number two kind of puzzles me. The only thing that makes sense to me here, is that this deflation is intended to hit those states with particularly high costs per amount collected harder than those who perform better.

Secondly, you’ll note that the Fed’s place double the weight of state administered child support payments assigned to the State for collection; either by order or agreement.

So, with respect to incentive pools, I’m deducing:

(1) An incentive to maximize the amount of child support ordered.
(2) An incentive to maximize the amount of child support collected.
(3) An incentive to avoid high collection costs.
(4) An incentive to assign collections to the State for Administration.
(5) A penalty to incentive base amounts for child support amounts in arrears.In other words, the name of the game here for States, is to generate the biggest number possible (incentive base amount) constrained by the maximum incentive base amount. Once these numbers are in for the year, shares are created and the pie is split up.

Now, as it relates observation (3), this is why I really wanted the budget data. States already get reimbursed for 66% of their hard costs, and get a little bit of extra in there for a couple of other things. The part that’s concerning, is the allowable expanse for “other” expenses approved by the Secretary. Because as I see it, it would not be all that difficult shore up the remaining 34% with all kinds little creative accounting tactics if the political sentiment supported the behavior – this is a political black box in the accounting (as I see it).

Summary:

(1) States get reimbursed for 66% of the hard costs of collecting and administering child support.

(2) States bonus funds for welfare programs using a formula consistent with Federal medical program reimbursements.

(3) States get bonus funds from a shared incentive pool, in which those incentives are driven by the nominal amount of child support collected and the performance in collecting it. And nowhere in the Act, do I see language that mandates how this incentive money is to be spent by states (as opposed to (1) and (2). In my mind, this makes it a Federal subsidy landing in the discretionary (general) budget of the States. ”

A fine group of elected officials we have here.

It really does seem to be all about the “Best interests of the children.”

Not.

~ Michael

Original Memo:

https://loveandiron.wordpress.com/2012/08/28/the-ugly-truth-why-states-and-courts-dont-want-shared-parenting/

The Ugly Truth: Why States and Courts Don’t Want Shared Parenting 10

This is a repost of the following Facebook Memo I posted on 8/28/12:

Memo To Followers:

Federal Title IVD Payments and Bonuses to States For the Collection and Administration of Child Support Payments.

Recently, I’ve been getting some queries about why I’ve been hammering so much on the issue of child support payments. And, I suspect, we’ve lost a follower or two because I’ve sort of ratcheted up the rhetoric on this topic a bit lately.

In fact, a couple of weeks a ago, we were having a discussion on this page in which I was asserting that States can receive anywhere from $1 to $2 in Federal subsidy payments for every dollar they collect and administer in child support payments.  And it was during one of this discussion that one of our followers asked the simple question, “Do you have any documentation on this?”.

Well, at the time, the only information I had available was budget information from the Office of Child Support Enforcement from 2009. So I contacted Michael McKormick at the American Coalition for Fathers and Children and he confirmed that my information was also the most recent published data he had as well (He also noted that Obama administration has been highly resistant to publishing any current budget data on this matter….).

In any case, enter my new best friend, Rita Fuerst Adams from Fathers and Families (Fathersandfamilies.org).

Because Rita was able to track down for me the actual act that describes exactly how these payments and bonuses are calculated.

I’ve Attached The Link For You Below. But Here Is The Short Story Version:

NetworkedBlogs

*The program is administered by the Office of Child Support Enforcement within the Administration of Children and Families; which is governed by the Department of Health and Human Services.

* The Act governing the program is known as the `Child Support Performance and Incentive Act of 1998′.

* There are bonus and penalty measures that determine the funding.

* Incentive Payments to States –

(1) IN GENERAL- The incentive payment for a State for a fiscal year is equal to the incentive payment pool for the fiscal year, multiplied by the State incentive payment share for the fiscal year.

(2) INCENTIVE PAYMENT POOL-

(A) IN GENERAL- In paragraph (1), the term `incentive payment pool’ means–

(i) $422,000,000 for fiscal year 2000;

(ii) $429,000,000 for fiscal year 2001;

(iii) $450,000,000 for fiscal year 2002;

(iv) $461,000,000 for fiscal year 2003;

(v) $454,000,000 for fiscal year 2004;

(vi) $446,000,000 for fiscal year 2005;

(vii) $458,000,000 for fiscal year 2006;

(viii) $471,000,000 for fiscal year 2007;

(ix) $483,000,000 for fiscal year 2008; and

(x) for any succeeding fiscal year, the amount of the incentive payment pool for the fiscal year that precedes such succeeding fiscal year, multiplied by the percentage (if any) by which the CPI for such preceding fiscal year exceeds the CPI for the second preceding fiscal year.

(B) CPI- For purposes of subparagraph (A), the CPI for a fiscal year is the average of the Consumer Price Index for the 12-month period ending on September 30 of the fiscal year. As used in the preceding sentence, the term `Consumer Price Index’ means the last Consumer Price Index for all-urban consumers published by the Department of Labor.

*** So essentially, the pool value increases every year at growth rate equal to the consumer price index. Which for 2012, would put the incentive pool at a little over 530,000,000****

(3) STATE INCENTIVE PAYMENT SHARE- In paragraph (1), the term `State incentive payment share’ means, with respect to a fiscal year–

(A) the incentive base amount for the State for the fiscal year; divided by

(B) the sum of the incentive base amounts for all of the States for the fiscal year.

Now, here’s where it gets important, because this is where the base value figures are established:

(4) INCENTIVE BASE AMOUNT- In paragraph (3), the term incentive base amount’ means, with respect to a State and a fiscal year, the sum of the applicable percentages (determined in accordance with paragraph (6)) multiplied by the corresponding maximum incentive base amounts for the State for the fiscal year, with respect to each of the following measures of State performance for the fiscal year:

(5) MAXIMUM INCENTIVE BASE AMOUNT-

(A) IN GENERAL- For purposes of paragraph (4), the maximum incentive base amount for a State for a fiscal year is–

(i) with respect to the performance measures described in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of paragraph (4), the State collections base for the fiscal year; and

(ii) with respect to the performance measures described in subparagraphs (D) and (E) of paragraph (4), 75 percent of the State collections base for the fiscal year.

Skipping some stuff here…

(C) STATE COLLECTIONS BASE- For purposes of subparagraph (A), the State collections base for a fiscal year is equal to the sum of–

(i) 2 times the sum of–

(I) the total amount of support collected during the fiscal year under the State plan approved under this part in cases in which the support obligation involved is required to be assigned to the State pursuant to part A or E of this title or title XIX; and

(II) the total amount of support collected during the fiscal year under the State plan approved under this part in cases in which the support obligation involved was so assigned but, at the time of collection, is not required to be so assigned; and

(ii) the total amount of support collected during the fiscal year under the State plan approved under this part in all other cases.

(A) The paternity establishment performance level.

(B) The support order performance level.

(C) The current payment performance level.

(D) The arrearage payment performance level.

(E) The cost-effectiveness performance level.

**So, you can see two important things here.

First, the reimbursements, payments, and bonuses are NOT determined by a reimbursement of State expenses incurred. In fact, the minimization of State Collection Costs is a bonus item.

Secondly, and this is really important, the figures used are the child support funds that States have under administration.

*** See the link for the actual tables for calculating bonuses, etc****

And here is something I found interesting. Check this out:

(c) TREATMENT OF INTERSTATE COLLECTIONS- In computing incentive payments under this section, support which is collected by a State at the request of another State shall be treated as having been collected in full by both States, and any amounts expended by a State in carrying out a special project assisted under section 455(e) shall be excluded.

***i.e. If two States are working together to collect funds, they both get credit for the purposes of establishing bonuses – this is pure gravy.

 

Note a couple of things here.

First, the bonus values are doubled for the categories of paternity test performance and cost performance.

So why would the Feds care about State costs? Because this is the bonus and incentive program, and States already receive a 66% dollar for dollar reimbursement for administrative costs (and I’m not sure, I’ll have to check, but i think there is a way they can finagle the remaining 34% to get even dollar for dollar match) under a different section of the Social Security Act.

So, there you have it.

States can get up to 100% reimbursement for administrative costs plus up to two times the bonus pool share for two categories along with the rest of it.

Now add to this, the fact that Courts often charge fees for posting these certified payments, and may assess additional fees and fines for enforcement, and you’ve got a very lucrative incentive for States and Courts to maximize child support payments.

In Other Words, It Should Be No Surprise That:

(1) Child Support payments are maximized, regardless of whether the NCP can afford them. States and Courts don’t care; the debt can’t go way or be retroactively reduced.

(2) Equal and Shared parenting is disincented – this will reduce revenue to the States and Courts.

(3) More and more States are requiring mandatory garnishments and payment administration. People who are already paying on time will improve their performance ratings for bonus calculations.

(4) States like TX make it difficult for non-paternal parents relieve themselves of child support burdens.

And lastly,

(5) Why States and Courts are not persuaded by reasonable and humane arguments for shared parenting reforms.

The system has been corrupted by money and the Feds are driving this corruption.

It’s time to fire politicians.

~ Michael

Source:http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pol/related/3130.htm

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• Divorced Co-Parenting Oxymoron
• Child support needs to catch up to reflect new roles for fathers, say experts
• Dear 2016 Presidential Candidate, What’s causing the DCF deaths and the separation of our families?
• Please stop the unfair punishment of good fathers.
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The Love and Iron Project

You may recall that I recently posted a memo describing how States are profiting from the creation of absent parents (see the link below for the original post).

Well, in that post, I only described part of the money picture the States are getting.

And while I’m still working on it, below is copy from an email I recently sent to FatherandFamilies.org that provides a bit more clarity and detail about how The Feds providing financial incentives to States who create absent parents and/or maximize child support payements.

Again, if you feel lost, the original post is linked below.

“Hi Robert:
 
I’ve actually been working on honing in on exactly how all this works, because even in the post you’re referencing, I acknowledged some fuzziness within my own understanding.
 
I’ve also been working trying to get some recent budget data on this to sort of back test what…

View original post 909 more words